Ghana’s Supreme Court on April 29 unanimously upheld a five-year voting ban for people convicted of electoral offenses, ruling that Parliament may restrict the constitutional right to vote beyond the limits written into the Constitution, 1992. The decision in Fred Akweter v. Attorney General & Electoral Commission rejected a challenge by Akweter, a Ghanaian lawyer, who had argued that the franchise can be limited only on the grounds the Constitution itself names: citizenship, age, and soundness of mind.
Legal framework
The case centered on whether the constitutionally guaranteed right to vote can lawfully be restricted by Parliament beyond those expressly stated in Article 42. Article 42 provides that “every citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections and referenda.” The plaintiff argued that Sections 27, 28, 29, 36, and 41 of the Representation of the People Act, 1992 (PNDCL 284) are inconsistent with the Constitution. These provisions mandate the courts to suspend the voting rights of persons convicted of the relevant offenses for five years from the date of completing their terms of imprisonment.
This creates a conflict between Parliament’s powers to enact laws to limit rights and the entrenched rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The legal setting here is complex because while the document guarantees the vote, it also gives the legislature broad authority to regulate how elections function. The question before the bench was whether that regulatory power extends to stripping voting rights for specific crimes.
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The arguments before the bench
Akweter argued that the right to vote under Article 42 is a fundamental and inalienable entitlement for all eligible citizens. He contended that the Constitution’s limitations on voting are exhaustive and therefore Parliament cannot introduce additional restrictions. He further argued that the Electoral Commission has a mandatory duty to register all eligible voters and cannot impose extra eligibility criteria.
The Attorney General acknowledged the centrality of the right to vote in Ghana’s constitutional order but emphasized that like all rights, it is not absolute. Citing Article 12, the Attorney General argued that rights may be lawfully limited where such restrictions are necessary, proportionate, and serve the public interest. The government defended the impugned provisions of PNDCL 284 as legitimate safeguards designed to protect electoral integrity by deterring misconduct.
The Electoral Commission, as the second defendant, opposed the plaintiff’s case by emphasizing that while the right to vote is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute. Referring to Article 12 and precedents such as Mensima v. Attorney General, counsel argued that fundamental rights must be balanced against broader societal interests like public order and the integrity of democratic institutions. The Commission maintained that the five-year disqualification imposed by PNDCL 284 is a legitimate and proportionate restriction.
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This legal tension mirrors a broader debate seen in other democracies where the line between punishing a criminal act and stripping a citizen of a civic right often blurs. While some jurisdictions have moved toward restoring voting rights to former prisoners to ease reintegration, others maintain strict bans. The Ghanaian court’s approach suggests a preference for maintaining a strict separation between the punishment phase of a crime and the civic phase of citizenship.
Supreme Court’s decision
The Court, giving a unanimous decision, held that the claims of the plaintiff lacked merit and that the sections of PNDCL 284 imposed legitimate and constitutional restrictions. The Supreme Court delivered its lead judgment through His Lordship Dennis Dominic Adjei, who stated:
We are satisfied that the restrictions were properly made on a right to vote and to be registered as a voter under the universal adult suffrage, the restriction was made with a legitimate aim to disenfranchise the citizens convicted of the impugned crimes to prevent crimes involving some electoral offenses to ensure that democratic regime is preserved to function to promote civic responsibility and respect for rule of law, and the five-year disqualification from elections or public elections as the case may be is proportional to the offenses concerned.
The judgment drew on international standards to justify the ruling. The Court referenced the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, both of which Ghana has signed. The UN Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 25, stated that the right to vote may carry only reasonable restrictions and that suspensions based on criminal conviction must be objective and proportionate.
Implications for democracy
The Supreme Court’s decision carries significant implications for Ghanaian democracy. By upholding the five-year disenfranchisement of electoral offenders, the Court reinforced Parliament’s authority to enact laws to restrict rights and the Electoral Commission’s power to regulate elections. The ruling suggests that the preservation of democratic order can justify curtailing individual rights under specific circumstances.
